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EXERGEN V. WAL-MART:
A COSTLY CURE FOR THE PLAGUE OF
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
This note discusses the recent Federal Circuit case of Exergen
Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores,' in which the Federal Circuit adopted
very strict pleading standards for the patent infringement defense
of inequitable conduct. For purposes of providing context, this
note begins with a brief summary of inequitable conduct's
substantive doctrine and pleading standards, and an explanation of
how the defense came to be a "plague" upon patent litigation.2
Section III will explain the holding in Exergen, and Section IV
criticizes the court's rationale therein. Finally, Section V of this
note discusses the implications of Exergen's strict pleading
standards.
The Federal Circuit's justification for imposing such strict
pleading standards is questionable. The Federal Circuit cited no
authoritative precedent requiring it to apply the heightened
pleading standards of FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and the court entirely
failed to consider the policy implications of doing so.
Furthermore, the court derived inflexible rules for the application
of Rule 9(b) from questionable interpretations of tangentially
related precedent.
While these strict pleading standards will curtail the "plague" of
frivolous inequitable conduct allegations, the standards will also
prevent discovery of information required for many legitimate
inequitable conduct claims. Although discovery directed towards
other, relatively easily pled defenses to infringement can be used
to uncover certain information regarding inequitable conduct, such
discovery is insufficient to uncover all information necessary to
formulate an adequate pleading under Exergen. This will result in
a reduction in the accuracy and fairness of patent examinations due
1. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
2. E.g., Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
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to under-enforcement of applicants' duty to disclose information to
the PTO, as well as inequity for alleged infringers who are unable
to plead legitimate inequitable conduct claims.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Inequitable Conduct: Substantive Doctrine
1. Origins
Early U.S. patent statutes provided private actions and remedies
against fraudulently procured patents,3 but courts marginalized
these provisions.4  The modem doctrine is instead a judicial
creation stemming from principles of equity, the beginnings of
which lie in Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.5 In
Keystone, the appellate court dismissed a patent infringement
action, because the patentee concealed from the PTO information
concerning invalidating prior use of its invention.6 The court
based its holding upon the equitable principle that a party seeking
equitable relief must come to court with clean hands.7 The
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal
In Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Machinery Co.,' the Supreme Court first explicitly
recognized inequitable conduct as a defense to infringement.
Upon the basis of the unclean hands doctrine, the Court held that a
patent procured by the inequitable conduct of the applicant is
3. Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in
Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 38 (1993).
4. Id. at 38-39.
5. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 241 (1933).
6. Id. at 243-247.
7. Id. Note that this presumes infringement suits to be suits "in equity."
Under English law, an infringement suit could be brought in equity or at law.
By definition, suits brought in equity were those seeking an injunction, whereas
suits at law were those seeking damages. This distinction is also recognized in
the U.S. See Ebay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
8. Keystone, 290 U.S. at 247.
9. Precision Co. v. Automotive Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
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rendered unenforceable."0 The Court recognized that a patentee's
right to exclude the public from practicing the invention posed a
great threat to public interest." This implicitly addressed the
reluctance of earlier courts to allow a private party to assert the
plaintiffs inequitable behavior toward a non-party to the action
(the PTO) as its own defense. 2
2. Modern Substantive Doctrine
The creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 signaled the
beginnings of a uniform patent law and led to some attempts at
clarification of inequitable conduct doctrine. Current Federal
Circuit doctrine defines inequitable conduct as: "(1) an affirmative
misrepresentation of material fact, a failure to disclose material
information, or submission of false material information [to the
PTO], and (2) an intent to deceive the [PTO] examiner by such
material falsity."' 3  Whether pled as an affirmative defense or a
counterclaim, a finding of inequitable conduct with respect to an
application for a patent may render that patent unenforceable to the
world. "
10. Id. at 814-15, 819.
11. Id.
12. Goldman noted:
The Bell Telephone Co. Court vigorously asserted that
because the government "had taken from the public rights of
immense value and bestowed them upon the patentee" and
because it was the government that had been deceived and
misled, that it was appropriate for the government to be the
party to secure a remedy in the case.
Goldman, supra note 3, at 43 (quoting United States v. American Bell Tel. Co.,
128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888)).
13. Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals LP v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 583
F.3d 766, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
14. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 539 F.Supp.2d 1214, 1217 (S.D. Cal.
2007) (citing McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d
897, 908, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Refac Int'l, Ltd. v.
Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1578, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
3
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a. Materiality
The Federal Circuit noted the agreement among the circuit
courts and the PTO that the primary policy behind requiring
applicants to disclose material information to the PTO was to
facilitate fair examinations of patent applications and accurate
determinations of patentability. 5 Accordingly, the court adopted
the definition of materiality of the PTO's Rule 56, 16 as amended in
1977, which sets forth the duty to disclose information material to
patentability to the PTO. 7 The rule defined information as
material "where there is [1] a substantial likelihood that [2] a
reasonable examiner [3] would consider it important [4] in
deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent."' 8
This standard was broader than any standard of materiality
previously applied by any court.'
In 1992, the PTO revised Rule 56.2" The new standard defined
information as "material" only if it "is not cumulative to
information already of record . . . in the application, and [i]t
establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a
prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or [i]t refutes, or is
inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes" in arguments
made to an examiner regarding patentability. 2' The Federal
Circuit, however, found no reason to defer to the PTO and
continued to apply the "reasonable examiner" standard of the 1977
rule as an all-encompassing standard of materiality.22
Concurrently, the Federal Circuit applied four other holdover
standards, which the court explained were encompassed by the
reasonable examiner standard. 3 As of the publication of this note,
15. Goldman, supra note 3, at 72.
16. Rule 56, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2009).
17. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1362-63 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
18. Id. at 1362 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1983) (amended 1992)).
19. Goldman, supra note 3, at 72 (citing 37 CFR § 1.56 (1983) (amended
1992)).
20. Id.
21. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2009).
22. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363.
23. The four encompassed standards are: (1) the 1992 Rule 56 standard of
materiality; (2) "the objective 'but for' test 'where the misrepresentation was so
452 [Vol. XX:2
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all five standards are still in use. 24  Under these standards of
materiality, many different types of conduct fell within the scope
of inequitable conduct.
b. Intent
Since its inception, the Federal Circuit recognized the
difficulties arising from the typical scarcity of direct evidence of
intent to deceive the PTO. The court held that intent "may be
proven by a showing of acts the natural consequences of which are
presumably intended by the actor" and that "[s]tatements made
with gross negligence as to their truth may establish such intent."26
Under this view, inferences of intent could be drawn from proof
that: (1) an applicant actually knew of the existence of material
information 27; and that (2) the applicant knew or should have
known that such information was material to the application.28
This "gross negligence" approach was marginalized29 and
ultimately discarded in Kingsdown Med Consultants, Ltd. v.
Hollister Inc. for a strict requirement of intent to deceive. °
Kingsdown required proof that the applicant actually knew that the
information was material.3' In other words, proof that the
material the patent should not have issued'; (3) "the subjective 'but for' test
'where the misrepresentation actually caused the examiner to approve the patent
application when he would not otherwise have done so"'; and (4) "the 'but it
may have' test 'where the misrepresentation may have influenced the [patent]
examiner in the course of prosecution"' Kate McElhone, Inequitable Conduct:
Shifting Standards for Patent Applicants, Prosecutors, and Litigators, 17 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 385, 393-94 (2009) (citing Digital Control Inc. v. Charles
Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
24. Id. at 394 (citing Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1314-15).
25. Id. at 395.
26. Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
27. American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363-64.
28. In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
29. Goldman, supra note 3 at 81-82 (discussing FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc
Co., Inc., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
30. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
31. James E. Hanft & Stacey S. Kerns, The Return of the Inequitable
Conduct Plague: When "I Did Not Know" Unexpectedly Becomes "You Should
Have Known ", INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Feb. 2007, at 1.
453
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applicant "should have known" that the information was material
became insufficient.32 Later Federal Circuit cases, however, have
wavered in their application of Kingsdown. Some permitted
inferences of intent to be drawn merely from the fact that an
applicant was aware of omitted material information, without
proof that the applicant actually knew that the information was
material.33
B. Inequitable Conduct Pleading Standards
Pleadings in federal actions generally require short and plain
statements of jurisdiction, cause of action, and demand for relief as
delineated in FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b).34 An exception to this standard
is set forth in FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b), which requires that pleadings of
fraud or mistake "state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake."35 Prior to the existence of Federal
Circuit, all but one district court considered whether Rule 9(b)
applied to inequitable conduct pleadings and held that Rule 9(b)
did apply.36
Because Rule 9(b) offers no guidance specific to cause of action,
courts applied an ad hoc approach as to the requirements of Rule
9(b) with regard to inequitable conduct pleadings.37  Some
jurisdictions applied Rule 9(b) strictly, requiring the pleading of
nearly all relevant facts, while other jurisdictions applied a more
32. Id.
33. Hanft, supra note 32, at 1; see, e.g., Ferring v. Barr, 437 F.3d 1181,
1190-94 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding intent on the basis that the inventor "should
have known" the materiality of declarant's previous employment); Hoffmann-
La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(finding deceptive intent based on the inventor's use of the past tense in an
example thereby illustrating the court's negative inference against the inventors
by assuming a deceptive intent under circumstances that can be interpreted
equally in either);Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d
1347, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (applying "should have known" reasoning to
impute inventor's knowledge of materiality of the use of prophetic data).
34. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)-(b).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
36. David Hricik, Wrong About Everything: The Application by the District
Courts of Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 895, 895 (2003).
37. Id. at 935.
454 [Vol. X-X:2
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lenient standard.3" Courts and, in turn, the litigants, were left
uncertain of the proper pleading standards regarding intent and the
specificity required in identifying allegedly material information.39
In addition, courts disagreed as to whether the inequitable conduct
pleading must stand on its own or whether other materials, such as
interrogatory responses, could supplement the pleading.4"
Courts did agree that a bald assertion of fraudulent or
intentionally misleading conduct in the patent application process
did not satisfy Rule 9(b)'s pleading standards.41 On the opposite
end, courts widely held sufficient specific identification of the
allegedly material information and individuals who were under to
a duty to disclose and who knew of the allegedly material
information."
C. The Plague
The ever-increasing scope of conduct considered inequitable by
courts and the willingness of many courts to infer intent made
inequitable conduct an increasingly popular defense.43 It became
attractive to courts as well, because disposing of an infringement
case by finding inequitable conduct was decidedly easier than
dealing with the complex and technical issues of patent validity
and infringement.'
By 1984, the Federal Circuit had recognized that the "gross
negligence standard of intent combined with the lower standard of
materiality was inducing parties to assert the inequitable conduct
defense" to the point that it was "overplayed . . . appearing in
nearly every patent suit, and ... cluttering up the patent system. 45
In the 1988 case of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp., the
Federal Circuit opined that "the habit of charging inequitable
38. Michael A. Weidinger, Inequitable Pleading: Defendants' Particular
Burden in Patent Infringement Suits, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1178, 1200-01
(1994).
39. Id.
40. Hricik, supra note 36, at 935-44.
41. Id. at 935.
42. Id.
43. Goldman, supra note 3, at 70.
44. Id. at 67.
45. Id. at 85.
455
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conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute
plague."46
Overpleading of inequitable conduct can cause a variety of
problems. A claim of inequitable conduct can lead to extensive
discovery that is both expensive and invasive to the patentee,
largely due to the relevance of intent and knowledge of the
applicant and its agents involved in the application. 7 In addition,
the defense raises complex attorney-client privilege issues and
detracts from the primary issues of infringement and validity.48
III. EXERGEN CORP. V. WAL-MART STORES, INC.
A. The Facts
In Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Exergen sued
Systems Application of Advanced Technology, Ltd. and Daiwa
Products, Inc. (collectively "SAAT") for infringement of three of
Exergen's patents ('813, '205, and '685)."9 In its answer, SAAT
asserted noninfringement and invalidity.5 ° Nearly one year later,
SAAT moved to amend its answer pursuant to Rule 15(a) to add
inequitable conduct as an affirmative defense to its alleged
infringement of the '813 and '685 patents.5 The district court
denied the motion to amend for failure to plead the elements of
inequitable conduct with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule
9(b). 2 On appeal, SAAT focused on its proposed inequitable
conduct pleading with regard to only one of Exergen's patents,
'685. 53
46. Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422.
47. Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 739-40 (2009).
48. Id.
49. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1317. Exergen's patents claimed thermometers that
detect radiation from different locations on the surface of the human body, such
as the skin covering the temporal artery, and calculate and display the internal
temperature based on the surface measurements. Id. at 1316-17.
50. Id. at 1317.
51. Id. at 1316.
52. Id. at 1317.
53. Id. at 1325.
456 [Vol. XX:2
8
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 8
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss2/8
2010] EXERGEN V. WALMART INEQUITABLE CNDT
SAAT's proposed amendment alleged that the patent was
"unenforceable due to [two independent instances of] inequitable
conduct by Exergen, its agents and/or attorneys during the
prosecution of the application for the '685 patent before the
PTO. 54 First, SAAT alleged that Exergen failed to submit to the
55PTO material prior art references of which it was aware.
Specifically, SAAT alleged that prior to the filing of the '685
application, Exergen filed two prior patent applications5 6 that were
material to the '685 patent, because they "disclose[d] a technique
of scanning a radiation detector across a target to measure the
maximum emitted radiation, and [were] not cumulative to the
information already of record in the prosecution history of the '685
patent. ' 57
The second alleged act of inequitable conduct was that Exergen
made an affirmative misrepresentation: "Exergen made a number
of arguments to the PTO to overcome rejections of the pending
claims based upon various prior art references related to tympanic
temperature detectors. 58 SAAT alleged that these arguments were
contradicted by certain material appearing on Exergen's website. 9
B. The Holding
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
SAAT's Rule 15(a) motion to amend its pleading.6" The Federal
Circuit reviewed the denial under the First Circuit's abuse of
discretion standard, as appellate review of such a denial is
governed by the law of the regional circuit in which it occurs.6'
However, Federal Circuit law governs the underlying question of
whether inequitable conduct has been pled with sufficient
particularity, and so the Federal Circuit took the opportunity to
clarify the standard.62
54. Id. at 1325.
55. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1325-26.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1325.
58. Id. at 1326.
59. Id.,
60. Id. at 1331.
61. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1318.
62. Id. at 1326.
457
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1. Who, What, Where, When, and How
Writing for the majority, Judge Linn cited the court's 2003
holding in Central Admixture Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiac Solutions that, although inequitable conduct is broader in
scope than fraud,63 it must nevertheless be pled with particularity
as required by Rule 9(b).' The court adopted the 7th Circuit's
approach to pleadings subject to Rule 9(b),65 holding that
inequitable conduct pleadings must point out the "who, what,
when, where, and how of the [alleged] material misrepresentation
or omission committed before the PTO."66 Pleadings that allege
the substantive elements of inequitable conduct without setting
forth the particularized factual bases for the allegation do not
suffice.67
Regarding "who," the pleadings must specifically identify the
individual who had a duty to disclose material information to the
PTO and who allegedly knew of and withheld material
information.68 Regarding "what" and "where," the pleadings must
identify the material information itself and where the material
portion can be found, as well as the claims and limitations to
which the omitted or misrepresented information pertains.69
Regarding "how," the pleadings must explain why the information
is material and not cumulative to information already in the record,
and how an examiner would have applied the information to the
63. Inequitable conduct markedly differs from fraud, because it does not
require that the victim (the PTO) rely upon the misrepresentation or omission.
Hricik, supra note 36, at 913. The elements of common law fraud are "1) a
representation of a material fact; 2) the falsity of that representation; 3) the
intent to deceive; 4) the complainant's justifable reliance upon the
representation; and 5) an injury resulting from that reliance." Weidinger, supra
note 38, at 1182.
64. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1326 (citing Central Admixture Pharmacy Servs.,
Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, 482 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) explicitly covers only allegations of fraud or mistake. FED.
R. Civ. P. 9(b).
65. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327.
66. Id. (quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir.1990)).
67. Id. at 1326-27.
68. Id. at 1329.
69. Id.
[Vol. XX:2
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examination of the claims at issue.7 °
In applying the above standard to SAAT's pleading, the court
found the pleading factually deficient for three reasons.7 First, the
pleading failed to specifically name the individual who "knew of
the material information and deliberately withheld or
misrepresented it" for the purpose of misleading the PTO (the
"who").72 Simply naming "Exergen, its agents and/or attorneys"
was insufficient. Second, the pleading failed to identify the
claims (the "what") of Exergen's patent and the limitations therein
(the "where") to which the references were relevant.74 Third, the
pleading failed to identify the material portions of the claims in the
reference patents that Exergen allegedly withheld (the "how" and
"why"). 75 The court held that these three factual deficiencies were
by themselves fatal to SAAT's amended pleading.76
2. Requisite States of Mind
In addition, the court held that although Rule 9(b) permits
knowledge, intent, and other states of mind to be averred
generally,77 the facts alleged must allow the court to "reasonably
infer" the requisite states of mind." The requisite states of mind
are: "(1) knowledge of the withheld material information or of the
falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) specific intent to
deceive the PTO. 79
a. Knowledge of Withheld Material Information
Regarding the withheld patent references, the court held that the
70. Id. at 1329-30.
71. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1330.
77. Rule 9(b) allows for more general allegations with regard to elements of
"intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind." Hricik, supra note
36, at 913.
78. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1330.
79. Id.
459
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facts as pled did not give rise to a reasonable inference of
knowledge of withheld material information." The court first
found fault with SAAT's allegation that "Exergen" was aware of
the two earlier patents, 81 noting that "Exergen" itself was not a
specific individual who owed a duty of disclosure to the PTO with
respect to the prosecution of the '685 patent.82 In addition, the
court held that even if an individual knew that the reference patent
existed, knowledge of its existence could not, without more, give
rise to an inference that the individual knew of the specific
material portion therein.83 Thus, SAAT's pleading failed to
establish that any individual knew of the allegedly material
information.
b. Knowledge of the Falsity of a Material
Misrepresentation
The court made even quicker work of SAAT's allegation
regarding inconsistency between information on Exergen's
website and certain statements that Exergen made to the PTO.
Judge Linn explained that SAAT's pleading lacked any facts
indicating that any individual who made these statements to the
PTO was actually aware of the allegedly contradictory statement
on the website.84 In other words, the pleading did not support the
requisite inference that an individual knew that the statements
were false. Such an individual could not be charged with
knowledge of the allegedly contradictory information on
Exergen's website, because the duty of disclosure does not require
an applicant to disclose material information of which he should
be aware.85 Nor is there a duty to inquire as to the existence of
such information, unless "sufficient information [is] presented to
the attorney to suggest the existence of specific information[,] the
materiality of which may be ascertained with reasonable
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1330.
85. Id.
[Vol. XX:2
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inquiry."86 Thus, the court found SAAT's pleading of inequitable
conduct deficient in nearly every substantive respect.
c. Intent to Deceive
The court then turned to the "specific intent to deceive"
requirement, finding fault with SAAT's pleading there as well.
SAAT pled the element of intent upon information and belief.87
However, the court held that SAAT's pleading lacked any
plausible reasons for its "belief,"88 because the pleading did not
indicate a "deliberate decision to withhold a known material
reference or to make a knowingly false misrepresentation."89
SAAT's basis for inferring deceptive intent was that Exergen
did not disclose to the PTO a reference patent in the prosecution of
the '685 patent that it had disclosed in prosecution of the related
'205 patent.90 However, the court refused to infer that a reference
material to one patent was material to another patent merely
because the two patents were related.9 The court noted two
further deficiencies that precluded an inference of intent. First,
SAAT made no allegations that the individual who had cited the
reference patent in the '205 application knew of the information in
that reference that was allegedly material to the '685 application.92
Second, SAAT made no allegations that this individual then
decided to deliberately withhold that information from the relevant
examiner.93
IV. ANALYSIS
In Exergen, the Federal Circuit required the utmost level of
86. Id.
87. Id. "Pleading on 'information and belief is permitted under Rule 9(b)
when essential information lies uniquely within another party's control, but only
if the pleading sets forth the specific facts upon which the belief is reasonably
based." Id.
88. Id. at 1330-31.
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1331.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
13
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thoroughness and specificity of inequitable conduct pleadings, and
it did so upon questionable grounds. First, the court provided
virtually no justification for its application of Rule 9(b) to
inequitable conduct. Furthermore, the court selected what appear
to be the strictest possible standards from the circuits' differing
interpretations of Rule 9(b), entirely ignoring the more lenient
Rule 9(b) interpretations adopted by some jurisdictions for
inequitable conduct pleadings. Moreover, the court did not
consider any of the policy implications of its harsh application of
Rule 9(b).
A. Application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
The court's determination that inequitable conduct pleadings
must satisfy Rule 9(b) rested upon the court's dicta in Ferguson
Beauregard, which simply took for granted the application of Rule
9(b) without analysis of the issue. Curiously, despite adopting
that view as a holding, the court did not provide justification in
Exergen either.
The typical justification for the application of Rule 9(b) to
inequitable conduct is that inequitable conduct constitutes fraud on
the Patent Office, and application of 9(b) to inequitable conduct
would further public policy of ensuring the disclosure.95 It should
be noted, however, that inequitable conduct markedly differs from
fraud,96 because it does not require the victim (the PTO) to have
relied upon the misrepresentation or omission.97
1. Who, What, Where, When, and How
Exergen gives a clear roadmap of the requirement of pleading
"who, what, where, when, and how."98 Although the court clearly
articulated the standards for each, its justifications for the
94. Id.at 1326 (citing Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover
Resources, Inc. v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed.Cir.2003)); See
also Ferguson Beauregard, 350 F.3d at 1343-44.
95. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1326.
96. See supra note 63.
97. Hricik, supra note 36, at 913.
98. See Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329-30.
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standards it adopted were decidedly lacking. Upon close
inspection of the court's reasoning in this area, it becomes clear
that the court was simply cherry-picking language in order to
establish the strictest pleading standards possible.
The requirement that an individual be specified ("who"), as
opposed to a business entity patentee may be clear, but it is poorly
justified. The court based this requirement on the fact that Rule 56
requires "individuals," of which classes are specifically provided,
to disclose material information to the PTO.99  However,
inequitable conduct is founded not upon the PTO's Rule 56 duty of
disclosure but the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands," which
bars equitable remedies for a party that has acted in a deceitful or
unfair manner in connection with the cause of action.' The court
used this very distinction as justification for retaining the
"reasonable examiner" standard of materiality despite the PTO
retiring that standard from Rule 56 in its 1992 amendment.'
Therefore, it is especially questionable that the court treats Rule 56
as authoritative here.
Also poorly justified is the requirement that the pleadings
identify specific claims and limitations therein to which the
material references are relevant ("what" and "where"). Again, the
court turned to Rule 56. The court reasoned that because the
current Rule 56 states that the duty to disclose "exists with respect
to each claim," pleadings must specifically identify the claim and
the limitation therein to which the material information
pertained. 1 2  However, the current, overarching standard of
materiality used by the Federal Circuit is not that of the current
Rule 56, but instead the "reasonable examiner" standard 3 from
99. Id. at 1329 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a), (c); Manual of Patent Examining
Procedures ("MPEP") § 2001.01 (8th ed., rev. 2, May 2004)).
100. See Keystone, 290 U.S. 244-45.
101. "'[T]here is no reason [] to be bound by any single standard... "' Digital
Control, 437 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363 in referring to
Rule 56's standard of materiality). See also supra note 21, and accompanying
text.
102. "The duty to disclose information exists with respect to each pending
claim until the claim is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the
application becomes abandoned." Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329 (citing 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56) (court's emphasis).
103. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363.
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the 1977 version of Rule 56, which refers to the application as a
whole, and makes no mention of "claims.""' If the court had
consulted 1977 rule, which is more relevant, it would have found
no indication that claims should be specified in the pleadings.
In addition, the court pointed to its holding in Regents of
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., which held that
"[i]nformation is material if a reasonable examiner would have
considered it important to the patentability of a claim."'' 5
However, Eli Lilly involved inequitable conduct on the merits, not
pleading standards. It is a great leap in logic for the court to apply
reasoning regarding the burden of proof directly to pleading
standards. Intent must be established by clear and convincing
evidence to meet the burden of proof at trial,1"6 whereas pleadings
must merely support a reasonable inference of intent.0 7
Furthermore, the authority that Eli Lilly cites for this proposition,
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., refers to the application as a
whole, not "claims," ''"8 and neither case was actually concerned
with this distinction.
In defining the above standards standards, the court drew
heavily from language of Rule 56 as well as a case dealing with
inequitable conduct on the merits. Both of these sources define
substantive standards, making no mention of pleading standards
whatsoever. At no point did the court make any attempt to explain
why the language in these sources should be directly applied to
pleading standards. The court's motives are most transparent in its
preference of the 1992 version of Rule 56 over the unequivocally
more relevant 1977 version; the court selected the 1992 version
simply because its language supported stricter pleading standards.
104. "[I]nformation 'is material where there is [1] a substantial likelihood
that [2] a reasonable examiner [3] would consider it important [4] in deciding
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent."' Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at
1362 (citing 37 CFR 1.56(a) (1983)).
105. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed.Cir. 1997)).
106. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 468 F.3d
1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
107. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1330.
108. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
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2. Requisite States of Mind
a. Knowledge of Withheld Material Information
Exergen articulates a very strict standard for pleading
knowledge of withheld material information. The crux is that the
court must look to the specific material information, not the entire
reference in which that information exists."°9 Even if knowledge of
a specific reference can be attributed to an individual involved
with the prosecution, the court held knowledge of a specific,
material portion of the reference does not necessarily follow."0
The court explained that "[a] reference may be many pages long,
and its various teachings may be relevant to different applications
for different reasons."'' I  Thus, where the pleadings support a
reasonable inference that the prosecuting individual is aware of a
reference, additional facts must be pled to indicate that the
individual knew of specific material portions therein.
The court cited FMC v. Manitowoc for the proposition that
pleadings must indicate specific material "information," as
opposed to an entire reference or document in which such
information appears." 2 However, the court conveniently failed to
mention that, with one exception, every time the word
"information" appears in that opinion, it appears in the phrase "art
or information" or "documents and information.""' 3 In the sole
exception, FMC used "information" interchangeably with
"documents.""' 4 Thus, pleadings that indicate an entire document
or reference should suffice as well. Moreover, FMC dealt with
inequitable conduct on the merits as opposed to the pleadings, and
the level of specificity required in identifying material information
was not even at issue in FMC. Requiring an assertion that the
individual knew of a specific, minute portion of a reference is a
pointlessly mechanical rule that could operate to confound the
109. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1330.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing FMC, 835 F.2d at 1415).
113. FMC, 835 F.2d at 1415-1416.
114. Id. at 1415.
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ultimate issue: whether one could reasonably infer that the
individual knew of that information.
b. Knowledge of the Falsity of a Material
Misrepresentation
Pleading knowledge of the falsity of a material
misrepresentation is also burdensome. The court illustrates this
requirement by recounting the decision of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals in King Automotive,"5 a trademark inequitable
conduct case. There, an alleged trademark infringer asserted that
the trademark registrant, who registered the mark "SPEEDY
MUFFLER KING," committed inequitable conduct by falsely
declaring to the PTO that it was unaware of any third-party use of
a confusingly similar trademark.1 6 The court held the pleadings
insufficient because the defendants failed to create a reasonable
inference that the registrant knew his declaration to be false. The
court reasoned that even if one could reasonably infer from the
pleadings that registrant knew of another's use of the mark
"MUFFLER KING," this did not give rise to a reasonable
inference that the registrant believed the marks to be confusingly
similar."7
Considering the strong similarity of the marks involved in King
Automotive, Exergen set a very strict standard for pleading
knowledge of the falsity of a material misrepresentation to the
PTO. It is true that "SPEEDY MUFFLER KING" and
"MUFFLER KING" are not necessarily confusingly similar.
However, pleadings must only support a reasonable inference, not
an inescapable conclusion. It seems reasonable to infer that a
registrant would find "SPEEDY MUFFLER KING" and
"MUFFLER KING" similar enough to confuse customers.
Nonetheless, regarding this issue, the Exergen court managed to
cite a case that considered inequitable conduct pleading standards
as opposed to the burden of proof, and the court appeared to
correctly characterize the precedent. By setting such a high
115. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328 (citing King Auto., Inc. v. Speedy Muffler
King, Inc., 667 F.2d 1008 (CCPA 1981)).
116. King Auto, 667 F.2d at 1009-10.
117. Id. at 1011.
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threshold for drawing reasonable inferences, Exergen essentially
requires smoking gun evidence of knowledge.
c. Intent to Deceive
Exergen also makes it very difficult to plead sufficient facts to
support a reasonable inference of intent to deceive the PTO.
Pleadings must support a reasonable inference of a "'deliberate
decision to withhold a known material reference' or to make a
knowingly false misrepresentation .... .8 Although the Federal
Circuit indicated that it would "decline to infer facts to support a
claim that must be pled with particularity,"'1 9 intent must generally
be "inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
applicant's conduct."'20 In other words, intent must generally be
inferred from circumstantial evidence, because direct evidence of
intent is rarely available. 2 '
The court found that the pleadings failed to adequately allege
intent for two reasons. First, although an individual disclosed the
allegedly material reference in the course of the earlier, related
patent application, there was no indication that at the time, he was
aware of specific information in the reference that was material to
the current patent application. 2 This is merely a reiteration of the
"knowledge of withheld material information" requirement.
Second, the pleadings contained no specific allegations indicating
that the individual then "decided to deliberately withhold [the
information] from the examiner."123 Therefore, even if the
pleadings demonstrate that an individual knew of withheld
material information, Exergen appears to require further
allegations to demonstrate that the individual made a "deliberate
decision to withhold a known material reference."' 24
Unfortunately, the court did not explain what additional facts
might indicate a decision to deliberately withhold information.
118. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1331.
119. Id. at 1328 (citing Ferguson Beauregard, 350 F.3d at 1344).
120. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
121. Id. at 1172.
122. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1331.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., 125
which presents circumstances similar to Exergen, provides a useful
example of circumstances that evince intent. Although McKesson
deals with a trial on the merits, as opposed to pleadings, facts that
satisfy the "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof
necessarily satisfy the lower pleading standard of "facts supporting
a reasonable inference." In McKesson, the court found clear and
convincing evidence of intent to deceive where the individual
responsible for the application omitted information regarding a
reference that was material to a related application.'26 There were
two circumstances present in McKesson that were not alleged in
Exergen, allowing the court to find intent. First, in McKesson, the
same individual was involved with both applications.127 Second,
claims in the withheld reference patent in McKesson were deemed
sufficiently similar to claims in the patent at issue. 128  Such
additional circumstances may very well have been present in
Exergen, but if so, SAAT failed to plead them.
V. IMPLICATIONS: STOPPING THE PLAGUE VERSUS CRIPPLING
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
Exergen adopts a very strict standard for pleading inequitable
conduct, even compared to standards of other jurisdictions that had
adopted Rule 9(b) for inequitable conduct pleadings.12 9 Because
Exergen requires defendants to all but present their entire case of
inequitable conduct at the pleading stage, it will render insufficient
the frivolous claims that were previously able to slip by in more
generalized pleadings. Thus, the Federal Circuit may have finally
managed to cure the so-called plague of inequitable conduct.
The problem is that Exergen may achieve this result at the cost
of hindering a large amount of legitimate claims, because an
alleged infringer may not have pretrial access to the information
necessary to adequately plead inequitable conduct. Unfortunately,
"at the outset of the suit the accused infringer will have at most a
125. 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
126. Id. at 911-12, 924-25.
127. Id. at 907.
128. Id. at911.
129. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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thimble-full of facts and the need to discover whether the full facts
reveal misconduct."13  Information pertaining to "who, what,
where, when, and how," as well as additional facts evincing intent
to deceive, will not necessarily be publically accessible in all
circumstances. Therefore, this requirement will hinder meritorious
allegations of inequitable conduct, crippling enforcement of the
duty to disclose material information to the PTO. This directly
countervails the Federal Circuit's adamant adherence to its broad
view of materiality.' Where inequitable conduct claims are
stifled, so too is the doctrine's ability to facilitate efficient and
accurate determinations of patentability. Instead, Exergen's
hindrance of so many legitimate inequitable conduct claims may
create incentives for unscrupulous applicants and attorneys to
conceal material information from the PTO.
A. Obstacles to Pleading
Even where a patentee has actually committed inequitable
conduct, an opposing party's ability to plead inequitable conduct
depends largely upon the matter of whether information necessary
for pleading lies uniquely within the patentee's control. 32 Much of
the information pertinent to patent applications is public; the
claims, specification, and prosecution history of a patent are public
record. 33 The prosecution history "contains the complete record of
all the proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office,
including any express representations made by the applicant
regarding the scope of the claims."'34
But not all information relating to a patented invention is
necessarily public. For example, test results or records of prior
sales of the invention may be uniquely within the patentee's
control."' Thus, without discovery, a party asserting inequitable
conduct may not be able to discern whether certain representations
130. Hricik, supra note 36, at 923.
131. See Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363.
132. See Hricik, supra note 36, at 953-54.
133. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
134. Id. at 1582.
135. Hricik, supra note 36, at 922 n.107.
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regarding such information are, in fact, false.136 The same problem
arises with omissions as well. A patentee may have withheld any
type of material information, not just prior art, which is by
definition publicly available. 37 Omissions of material information
uniquely within the knowledge and control of the patentee may
have occurred, such as abandonment of the invention. 3 ' In the
absence of discovery, such circumstances preclude adequate
pleading of the "who, what, when, where, and how of the [alleged]
material misrepresentation or omission committed before the
PTO. ,,5 13 9
Factual bases for attributing knowledge and intent to an
individual may also be uniquely within the knowledge and control
of the patentee or the specific individual, and therefore
unobtainable without discovery. For example, SAAT's allegation
of inequitable conduct based upon affirmative misrepresentation
failed, because there was no indication that the individual who
made the representation knew of contradictory statements on
Exergen's own website 40 The individual may have viewed that
information on Exergen's website without telling anyone. Without
means of compelling that individual to admit his knowledge and
find evidence such as examining his internet browsing history, an
opposing party would be unable to adequately plead knowledge.
B. "Piggybacking" Discovery
Discovery is, of course, predicated on the pleadings; only
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense and reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of
admissible evidence is discoverable. 4' The practical implication is
that discovery regarding inequitable conduct is not available until a
136. Id.
137. Even prior art references, though publically available by definition, 35
U.S.C.A. § 102, may be extremely inconspicuous. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d
897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that a single catalogued thesis in one university
library constituted prior art).
138. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(c).
139. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327 (quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d
624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)).
140. Id.
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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party pleads inequitable conduct and that pleading withstands
contest. It may seem, then, that there is no way to obtain
information critical to an inequitable conduct pleading if that
information is uniquely within the control of the patentee.
However, it may be possible to obtain some privately-held
information regarding instances of inequitable conduct through
discovery directed towards other, more easily pled defenses, 42
such as invalidity and noninfringement. For example, test results
that are material to a claim could be obtained through discovery
regarding an invalidity defense, whether or not the results would
ultimately render the claim invalid. It may then be possible to add
inequitable conduct to the pleading by amendment. 143
Information bearing upon the substantive requirements of
patentability, such as novelty, nonobviousness, and utility, is
clearly discoverable to support an invalidity defense, but what
about information that is material to an application but unrelated to
patentability, such as "incorrect filing status, failure to pay
maintenance fees, or relationships with affiants"?' 44 Some such
issues are related to other easily pled defenses, such as failure to
pay maintenance fees, which causes early expiration of the
patent, 45 and may thus be discovered in the context of those
defenses. 46  However, there is information that is simply not
subject to discovery outside of an inequitable conduct defense.
The Federal Circuit has taken the position that incorrectly specifies
the applicant as a "small entity," rendering the patent
unenforceable if the failure constitutes inequitable conduct. 47
142. Specifically, those subject to FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b), as opposed to 9(b).
See supra notes 34-42, and accompanying text.
143. "If... circumstances are not known at the beginning of the case but are
only learned in discovery, then Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 permits the amendment of
pleadings, with consent of the opposing party or leave of court 'freely given
when justice so requires."' Wayne L. Stoner, Rocket Dockets: Still an
Alternative?, 572 PLI/Pat 73, 85-86 (1999).
144. See Nicole M. Murphy, Inequitable Conduct Doctrine Reform: Is the
Death Penalty for Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MNN. L. REv. 2274, 2300
(2009).
145. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)-(g).
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
147. See Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139,
1141 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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While "piggybacking" inequitable conduct discovery onto easily
pled defenses may be effective at uncovering actual material
information regarding patentability, it is largely ineffective for
uncovering evidence of knowledge and intent pertaining to such
information. The knowledge and intent of the individual involved
in the prosecution are irrelevant to substantive patentability issues
such as novelty, nonobviousness, and utility. 48 Although a
response to discovery necessarily reveals the respondent's current
knowledge, it does not indicate whether the requisite knowledge or
intent existed at the relevant time: the time the misrepresentation
or omission was made. Knowledge at the time of the lawsuit (i.e.,
when the response to discovery occurs) is generally irrelevant to
substantive patentability or validity issues, because there is no duty
to disclose information material to a claim unless that claim is
currently pending or under examination.'49
VI. CONCLUSION
In Exergen, the Federal Circuit imposed strict pleading
standards without providing convincing justification or any policy
considerations. These burdensome pleading standards may prove
very effective at eliminating frivolous inequitable conduct claims
and thus stem the "plague." However, Exergen will also stifle
many types of legitimate inequitable conduct allegations. This
will lead to lead to inequity for alleged infringers as well as a
reduction in the accuracy and fairness of patent examinations
resulting from ineffective enforcement of applicants' duty to
disclose material information to the PTO.
Adam R. Andrea
148. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-103, 112.
149. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
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